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PENSION PRIORITIES: 
GETTING THE 
BALANCE RIGHT?* 
Tim Callan, Brian Nolan and John R. Walsh 
 The National Pensions Policy Initiative (NPPI) recommended a 
target replacement income of 50 per cent of pre-retirement income 
before tax, and an overriding minimum income of 34 per cent of 
gross average industrial earnings (GAIE). The Pensions Board 
(2005), in its National Pensions Review, confirmed these targets.1 
However, a number of Board members 
1. 
Introduction 
…believe that a higher minimum pension target is needed to ensure 
that pensioners without supplementary pensions have an adequate 
income by reference to household incomes generally. Other board 
members also support an increase in the basic pension target for reasons 
of greater social equity. 
Here we revisit these issues, and are able to analyse the trade-off 
between the costs of State pensions, the cost of State support for 
private pensions and the overall impact on poverty and the 
distribution of income. 
Our perspective includes both the minimum income guarantees 
through the State’s old age pension and pensions provided by 
employers (including the State and public authorities as employers). 
We also take account of privately organised pensions unrelated to 
the State or to employers. We begin (Section 2) by reviewing 
evidence on the risks of poverty faced by older people. As well as 
Irish evidence, we draw on a recent review of EU experience, which 
points to links between differences in pension systems and 
differences in poverty risk. Section 3 then examines more closely the 
impact of changes in State pension payment rates between 2000, 
when ‘at risk of poverty’ rates for older people were very high, and 
2006, by which time poverty risks for older people were much lower, 
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* We are grateful to the referees for their comments. 
1 The report notes that the representative of the Department of Finance did not 
agree to this target. 
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and close to the average. In this section we use the SWITCH tax-
benefit model to isolate that part of the reduction in poverty risk due 
to the changes in payment rates. 
Turning to potential future policy developments, Section 4 looks 
at options related to the income tax treatment of pension 
contributions. At present, all contributions – whether by an 
employer, the individual himself or herself, the State as employer, or 
made to a private pension plan – are allowable against income tax.2 
We estimate the total size and distributional impact of this tax 
expenditure. We then consider an illustrative package involving a 
“standardisation” of the tax relief on pensions – as was done with 
mortgage interest relief and relief on health insurance premia. This 
would generate a rise in income tax revenue which could be used in 
many ways. For simplicity, we examine first of all a flat rate increase 
in social welfare pensions (including all of the rates for those over 66 
years outside the main pension schemes). We then estimate the net 
cost and distributive effect of the package, and its likely “first round” 
impact on the ‘at risk of poverty’ measure. The final section draws 
together the main findings. 
 
 
2.1 POVERTY RISKS AMONG OLDER PEOPLE: TRENDS, 
LEVELS AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES IN 
IRELAND 
2. 
Poverty Risks 
Among Older 
People Measuring poverty gives rise to a range of conceptual and empirical 
issues which we cannot address here (though we have done so 
extensively in previous work). Instead, we focus on a key indicator in 
the EU’s Social Inclusion Process, the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, and 
how it has been changing for older people in Ireland. This counts as 
‘at risk of poverty’ persons living in households falling below a 
specified percentage of median income in the country in question, 
with the most commonly-used threshold being 60 per cent of the 
median. Table 1 shows how this ‘at risk of poverty’ measure  has 
evolved over the past 10 years in the Irish case, for older people and 
for all ages, drawing on results from the Living in Ireland Survey (1994 
up to 2001) and in more recent years, the EU Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU SILC).  
‘At risk of poverty’ rates were high for older people in the 1980s, 
but fell to 6 per cent by 1994 – well below the corresponding risk for 
all persons. This risk for older people rose sharply in the following 
years, rising to almost one in four by 1997, and to 44 per cent by 
2001. By this time the risk was more than double that for all persons. 
It is not clear how much of the decline from 44 per cent (Living in 
Ireland, 2001) to 30 per cent (EU SILC, 2003) is due to the difference 
in income definitions between the surveys (see note to table for 
details). But more recent figures from the CSO’s EU Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU SILC) indicate that ‘at risk of poverty’ rates 
for older people declined from just under 30 per cent to about 20 
 
2 The amount allowed is subject to limits in relation to income. 
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per cent between 2003 and 2005. This decline means that risk of 
income poverty for the elderly is now only marginally greater than 
the overall risk for all persons. However, as child poverty remains 
higher, the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate for older people is higher than the 
risk for working-age adults. 
Table 1: ‘At Risk of Poverty’ Measure for Older People and for All 
Persons, Ireland, Selected Years, 1994-2005 
    
 Data Source Percentage of Older 
People ‘at Risk of 
Poverty’ 
Percentage of All 
Persons ‘at Risk of 
Poverty’ 
1994 LII 5.9 15.6 
1997 LII 24.2 18.2 
2000 LII 38.4 20.9 
2001 LII 44.1 21.9 
    
2003 CSO EU SILC 29.8 19.7 
2004 CSO EU SILC 27.1 19.4 
2005 CSO EU SILC 20.1 18.5 
    
Note: While the income definitions in the two data sources (the Living in Ireland 
Survey up to 2001 and the EU SILC from 2003 onwards) are very similar, 
there is a difference which particularly affects older people. Non-cash benefits 
such as free electricity, gas and a TV licence are not included as part of 
disposable income in the Living in Ireland Survey, but are included with cash 
incomes in the EU SILC measure of disposable income. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that ‘at risk of poverty’ rate for 
older people is quite volatile. The volatility of the risk relates in part 
to the fact that many older people are heavily dependent on the State 
pensions, contributory and non-contributory. If these payment rates 
are close to the poverty threshold, then a small change either way (or 
a small additional income) can move many people above or below 
the threshold. 
Income is a key resource, but not the only element of “command 
over resources” that affects individuals’ and families’ standard of 
living. Nolan and Whelan (1996), argued for the use of a 
combination of information on income with key indicators of basic 
deprivation (being unable to afford basic items or activities) to 
identify those living in what was termed “consistent poverty”. This is 
the approach which has been adopted by the National Action Plan 
for Social Inclusion. Table 2 draws together published evidence on 
the rate of consistent poverty for older people, and for all persons.3 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The situation of older people in Ireland in terms of other measures of economic 
vulnerability has also been analysed in a number of recent studies by the ESRI, 
including the Social Portrait of Older People prepared for the Office for Social Inclusion 
(Fahey, Maître, Nolan and Whelan, 2007).)   
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Table 2: Proportions of Older People and of all Persons in 
Consistent Poverty, Selected Years, 1997-2005 
   
 Older People All Persons 
 At 60 Per Cent 
Median Income
At 70 Per Cent 
Median Income
At 60 Per Cent 
Median Income 
At 70 Per Cent 
Median 
Income 
1997  8.4 7.8 10.7 
1998   6.0 7.7 
2000   4.3 5.4 
2001  3.9 4.1 4.9 
2003 5.8  8.8  
2004 3.3  6.8  
2005 3.7  7.0  
     
Sources: 1997-2001: Whelan et al. (2003). 
 2003-2005: CSO Statistical Releases on EU SILC. 
 
Two key points emerge clearly from this table. First, the rate of 
consistent poverty for older people is always below the rate of 
consistent poverty for all persons. This contrasts with the risk of 
income poverty measure, where older people were sometimes at 
much lower risk than others, and sometimes at much greater risk. 
Second, the rate of consistent poverty for the elderly is very far 
below the ‘at risk of poverty’ measure. e.g., for 2003 the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate was close to 30 per cent (at the 60 per cent of median 
income cut-off) while the corresponding rate of consistent poverty 
was under 6 per cent. 
What gives rise to these quite different results for the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate and consistent poverty? The major factors relate to the 
non-income resources available to support the standard of living of 
the elderly. These include the fact that most older people own their 
own homes outright, without any mortgage. As a result, their 
housing costs are very low, and their cash incomes can stretch 
further in purchasing their other needs. The standard economic 
approach to take this into account is to move to a broader measure 
of income which includes the value of the “in-kind” benefit enjoyed 
by the home owner from his or her own property. Different 
valuation methods have been proposed, but the simplest way of 
thinking about this is that rather than the owner paying zero rent and 
having zero income from the property, he or she rents it to 
himself/herself. This “imputed rent” is added to the home-owners’ 
income to put the resources of the home owner on a similar footing 
to a tenant. Tenants may also benefit from an imputed rent, if they 
enjoy the use of a property at less than the market rent. These issues, 
including different valuation methods for imputed rent, and the 
implications for measurement of income distribution and poverty, 
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are currently being examined in a project involving 8 European 
countries.4 
Zaidi et al. (2006a) also point to the financial assets and wealth of 
older people as important considerations in determining their overall 
command over resources. For example, assets built up over earlier 
stages of the lifecycle may be used to provide resources additional to 
income. Given suitable data on financial assets one could calculate 
an annuity equivalent and add it to income as one way of taking this 
into account.5 One group whose command over resources might be 
substantially affected by this is older farmers, for whom the annuity 
equivalent of the farm as an asset may be well in excess of the 
income generated as a farm enterprise. However, the data required 
to implement this approach are not available at present for Ireland. 
Family support may also allow an older person to maintain a 
standard of living higher than their income alone would allow. 
2.2 INCOME POVERTY RISKS AMONG OLDER PEOPLE: 
IRELAND IN EU CONTEXT 
Before looking at possible reforms to the Irish pension system, it is 
worth looking at its effectiveness in comparative perspective. Such a 
comparison can be based on data produced by Eurostat for the EU’s 
Social Inclusion Process, but there are a number of caveats relating 
to the figures for Ireland which are discussed in detail in the 
Appendix to this paper. For that reason we concentrate here on the 
main messages to be drawn from the comparison of Ireland with our 
EU partners rather than on presenting precise figures. (The 
underlying problem is that different institutional structures for 
pensions make standardisation of the concepts and data 
problematic.) 
Focusing first on ‘at risk of poverty’ rates for older people, Zaidi 
et al. (2006a) use the data produced by Eurostat to divide EU 
countries into low, medium and high poverty risk groups. The high 
poverty risk group includes Ireland and the UK, along with Spain, 
Greece and Portugal – and while the precise figure for Ireland may 
not be robust this grouping still seems reasonable. The low poverty 
risk group includes several accession states, as well as the 
Netherlands, France and Luxembourg. The Dutch system has the 
lowest poverty risk of the three. Zaidi et al., point to the fact that the 
Netherlands has a universal, residence-based basic pension, indexed 
in line with wages, along with mandatory occupational pensions and 
generous survivors’ benefits in occupational pensions.  
Looking then at the effectiveness of pensions in reducing poverty 
risk, analysis conducted in the EU Joint Report on Social Inclusion 
suggests that the reduction in the risk of poverty achieved by the 
public pension system is relatively low in Ireland. By contrast, 
Ireland’s poverty reduction from other social transfers (affecting the 
 
4 The project is part of a broader one on Accurate Income Measurement for the 
Assessment of Policy (AIMAP). 
5 This approach was pioneered by Wolff (1990) for the US.  
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non-elderly) is closer to the average for EU15. This suggests that 
differences in pension systems had a key role to play in explaining 
the gap between the reduction in poverty achieved in several major 
EU countries and that achieved in Ireland. 
 
 Evidence from the CSO analysis of EU SILC surveys points to a 
sharp reduction in the proportion of older people ‘at risk of poverty’. 
In 2003, the risk for older people was close to 30 per cent – about 
one and a half times the risk for all persons. By 2005 the risk had 
fallen to just over 20 per cent, not much more than the risk for all 
persons (though higher than the risk for other adults). Comparison 
of the risk figures with earlier years is complicated by a difference in 
the treatment of non-cash benefits such as free electricity etc. 
3. 
State Pensions: 
Exploring the 
Impact of 
Recent Policy 
Changes 
Here we try to identify how much of the reduction is due to 
changes in the rates of payment for the main State pension rates 
(Old Age Contributory and Non-Contributory Pensions) along with 
rates paid to those on other schemes who are of pension age. We 
analyse this question by comparing the actual 2006 policy with a 
counterfactual policy, under which these pension rates would be 
indexed in line with wage growth from their 2000 levels, while all 
other policy parameters would remain at their actual 2006 levels. 
This isolates the impact of 2006 actual policy over and above a 
“neutral” policy, simply indexed in line with wages. (For a detailed 
rationale of this “distributionally neutral” policy, see Callan et al., 
2005.) 
The total cost of the actual 2006 pension rates, over and above 
the 2000 rates indexed in line with wage growth of 42 per cent, is 
estimated at €515 million. Table 3 shows how this amount is 
distributed over the deciles of equivalised income, and the 
proportionate gain in income for each decile. 
Table 3: Impact of Changes in State Pension Rates, Over and Above 
Wage Indexation, 2000-2006 
   
Decile 
Aggregate Gain in €m Per 
Annum Percentage Gain 
Bottom 89 5.7 
2nd 67 3.6 
3rd 180 6.1 
4th 102 2.1 
5th 25 0.4 
6th 20 0.3 
7th 11 0.1 
8th 7 0.1 
9th 5 0.1 
Top 8 0.0 
All 515 0.8 
   
The gains are strongly concentrated on the bottom four deciles of 
the income distribution. This group obtains 85 per cent of the total 
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benefit from the package of policy changes implemented between 
2000 and 2006. Income in these deciles rises by between 2 and 6 per 
cent, as against an overall figure of 0.8 per cent. 
Despite this strong concentration towards the bottom of the 
income distribution, the head count measure of the risk of poverty 
for older people declines by no more than 5 percentage points (from 
a base of about 40 per cent). However, there is a substantial 
reduction in the “poverty gap” measure which takes into account 
both the incidence of poverty – as measured by the head count – 
and the depth of poverty, how far those in poverty are below the 
income poverty line. This “poverty gap per person” measure falls by 
45 per cent. 
Table 4: Impact of Changes in State Pension Rates, Over and Above 
Wage Indexation, on ‘Risk of Poverty’ and Poverty Gap for 
Older People 2000-2006 
    
Poverty Risk 
Without 
Changes 
Poverty Risk with 
Changes 
 
Reduction in Poverty 
Risk 
 
Percentage 
Reduction in 
Poverty Gap 
40 35 5 45 
    
 
Such findings are not unusual, and reflect a key weakness in the 
commonly used “head count” measure of poverty. A policy may 
improve the lot of many poor persons, without raising any of them 
above the poverty threshold. In such circumstances, the head count 
measure will show no change in poverty, but the poverty gap 
measure will show a reduction depending on the extent to which the 
policy has brought people closer to the poverty threshold income. 
On the other hand, a policy which left the aggregate income of those 
initially in poverty unchanged, but transferred income from those 
who were poorest to those close to the poverty line income could 
result in a substantial fall in the head count. The lesson to be drawn 
from this is that we must look at both head count and poverty gap 
measures in order to obtain a fuller picture of the impact of policy 
changes (or of economic and social developments) on poverty risks.6 
 
 
 
 
 
6 It should be noted that there are two types of poverty gap measure. One, due to 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) combines information on the extent of poverty 
(as measured by the head count) and the depth of poverty (how far below the 
poverty line each poor person falls). An alternative measure is used in recent EU 
social inclusion analyses. It looks at the poverty gap (as a proportion of the poverty 
threshold) for the median poor person i.e., halfway between the poorest person and 
the poor person whose income is closest to the poverty line. There are advantages 
and disadvantages to each measure, but in either case, it is necessary to consider 
both the head count measure and the poverty gap measure to obtain a full picture. 
Here we use the poverty gap measure developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke. 
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The current tax treatment of occupational pension contributions is 
that both employer and employee contributions are deducted when 
calculating income for tax purposes. Alternatively, this can be viewed 
as a tax-free allowance equal to the value of the employee and 
employer contributions, allowable at the individual’s marginal rate of 
tax, be it standard rate or top rate. Payments by the self employed in 
respect of retirement annuity premia are also treated in the same 
way. These tax reliefs on pension contributions can also be regarded 
as “tax expenditures”. 
4. 
Tax 
Expenditures on 
Private Pensions 
The “tax expenditure” approach highlights the fact that the tax 
system is sometimes used to achieve goals which are similar to those 
of the public expenditure system. Identifying the cost of the tax 
reliefs, and their distribution across persons, is then an important 
element in assessing whether the policy approach is an efficient and 
effective way of achieving these goals. 
Tax expenditures are identified with reference to a benchmark tax 
system, including definitions of the tax base and the rate structure. 
As Whitehouse (1999) notes, there are variations in international 
practice in the identification of tax expenditures regarding pensions. 
In Australia, Canada, Spain and the United States, the 
comprehensive income tax – with pension benefits tax-free and 
contributions and investment returns taxed – is used as the 
benchmark....In the United Kingdom, the actual tax treatment is 
compared with a so-called ‘unapproved’ scheme, where contributions 
and investment returns are taxed but the withdrawal of the pension as 
a lump-sum is tax-free. This is equivalent to the comprehensive income 
tax treatment (i.e., TTE). Other countries (such as the Netherlands) 
do not report tax expenditures for pensions at all or (for example, 
Germany) choose a benchmark very much closer to the actual 
treatment. Whitehouse (1999, p. 29). 
 There is also substantial variation across countries in the actual 
tax regime applied to pensions, as documented by Whitehouse. The 
classic theoretical treatments of pension contributions, pension fund 
income, and pension payments to beneficiaries include (using the 
notation T for Taxed, E for exempt): 
EET: Pension contributions and pension fund income are 
exempt, and pension payments are taxed in the hands of the 
beneficiary. This corresponds to the expenditure tax treatment. 
TEE: This also relates closely to expenditure tax treatment, and is 
sometimes termed the “prepaid” expenditure tax treatment. 
One feature of interest in the present context is that countries use 
different forms of limitation on the amount by which tax liability can 
be reduced through increasing pension contributions. Whitehouse 
(1999) identifies the following possibilities: 
• absolute limits on the amount of contributions (e.g., 
Australia, Germany); 
• limits on the proportion of contributions that can be 
deducted (e.g., Austria, Finland); 
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• limits on the proportion of income on which contributions 
can be made (e.g., Ireland and the UK). 
In this paper we investigate another type of limitation, which 
limits the deductability of contributions at higher rates of income 
tax. Like many of the actual systems examined by Whitehouse, this 
diverges from the classic theoretical treatments, but analysis of this 
case is of some independent interest, given the political economy of 
standardising tax reliefs. Investigation of a full TEE regime is a topic 
of interest for further research. 
Whitehouse goes on to show that restricting the deductability of 
contributions is close to introducing a comprehensive income tax, 
whereas the current treatment in Ireland and in the UK is close to 
that of an expenditure tax. If the overall tax system were to move 
towards an expenditure tax base rather than an income tax one, the 
existing tax arrangements for pensions would involve little or no 
redistribution. Arguments for and against the differing treatments of 
pension contributions need to be considered in this wider context, 
but the likelihood of such a fundamental shift – debated here some 
years ago when the Commission on Taxation reported – seems 
slight. A prerequisite for an informed debate on this topic is a sense 
of the scale of the tax reliefs, and the distribution of the benefits 
which arise from them. It is to this issue that we now turn.  
Hughes and Sinfield (2004) show that similar tax arrangements in 
the UK and the US, designed to encourage the growth of private 
pension schemes, lead to a concentration of tax relief among the 
highest income groups. This is for two reasons.7 The first is that the 
rate of membership of occupational pension schemes (and 
contributions by the self-employed) rise strongly with income. The 
second is that tax relief is allowed at the top marginal rate. Hughes 
(2005) shows that tax relief is also highly concentrated towards the 
top of the Irish income distribution. 
This is confirmed by analysis using the SWITCH model. It differs 
from Hughes (2005) in two respects. First it is based on family units 
rather than households – though the results are similar in either case. 
Second, whereas Hughes looks at quintiles of employees and self-
employed separately, we use family income per adult equivalent, over 
the full income distribution, as the ranking criterion for division into 
quintile groups. The results are shown in Figure 1, and are broadly 
similar to those of Hughes. If anything, the contributions are 
concentrated somewhat more in the top quintile. Hughes (2005) 
found that the tax relief from retirement annuity premia paid by the 
self-employed were more strongly concentrated towards the top of 
the self-employed income distribution than the relief from employee 
contributions. 
 
 
 
 
7 Agulnik and Le Grand (1998) and Hughes (2005). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Benefit from Exemption of Employee 
Superannuation Contributions by Quintile of Family 
Units 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
Source: SWITCH model. 
 
It could be argued that the current income of the household is 
not the most relevant point of reference in thinking about the 
distributional implications of different approaches, and that some 
currently middle- or high-income households benefiting from the 
arrangements will be on much lower incomes when they retire. It 
would be very useful to complement the present analysis with a 
lifetime income perspective, and studies for some other countries 
have sought to do so. However, the evidence still suggests that, as 
Sinfield (1997) puts it (in relation to broadly similar arrangements in 
the UK): The greatest beneficiaries are those who have the least needs by any 
measure used in social policy analysis. It is of interest then to establish 
more closely the extent of the support being provided through this 
mechanism, and examine possible reallocations of resources which 
might better serve the overall objectives of social policy and 
pensions policy. Similar arguments have been accepted and acted 
upon in the case of mortgage interest tax relief, which is now 
allowed at the standard rate of tax, not at the top marginal rate. 
In order to provide a benchmark for the extent of the resources 
implied by the tax treatment of pension contributions, we have 
attempted to estimate the cost of tax reliefs in respect of employee 
contributions, employer contributions and self-employed 
contributions. One issue which arises in this context is the correct 
treatment of the State’s own public service superannuation scheme. 
This is a “pay as you go” scheme so there are no contributions to the 
core scheme, and benefits are paid out as they become due. In the 
present context, where both employer and employee superannuation 
contributions are exempt from tax, there are no particular tax issues 
associated with the accrual of pension benefits under the civil/public 
service superannuation scheme. If employee and employer 
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contributions were to become – to any extent – taxable, then an 
inequity would arise if the State scheme were to maintain a tax-free 
status because it is not explicitly funded. Thus, in principle, a similar 
approach would be required for the State superannuation scheme. 
The accrual of pension benefits, while not recorded in pay, would 
amount to a “benefit-in-kind” that would have to be valued and 
taxed in the same way as contributions to a fund. Otherwise a sharp 
inequity would arise between public and private sector employees. 
There are of course many issues which would arise from such a 
change, including implications for wage bargaining in the public and 
private sectors, and the detail of how it would be administered and 
implemented. Here we abstract from these issues to get a broad view 
of the overall impact of a shift in the tax treatment in pensions. It is 
worth noting, however, that if, tax relief were restricted to the 
standard rate, then only those on the top rate of tax would be 
affected by the change.  
The estimates of pension contributions were constructed as 
follows: 
• Employee contributions were derived from information 
provided by employees on deductions from pay. Employee 
membership of an occupational pension scheme was 
measured using questions from the Living in Ireland Survey, 
as used in studies of the coverage of pensions.  
• Typically employee contributions were of the order of 5 
per cent, and employer contributions at 10 per cent. But as 
this split could differ, and we had direct information on 
employee contributions only, employer contributions were 
constructed as the balance between the employee 
contribution and 15 per cent. This assumption involves the 
same total contribution rate for all schemes. If, as is likely, 
contribution rates are higher for higher paid workers – as a 
tax efficient method of compensation – then the estimates 
derived here would understate the share of top earners in 
the tax relief. 
• For the self-employed, information directly provided by 
respondents was used. 
• For public sector employees, it was assumed that the 
government’s contribution was sufficient to bring the total 
contribution to 20 per cent of pay, given that the public 
service pension scheme offers higher income guarantees 
(including parity with those in employment in the same 
grade). 
This combination of data and “stylised facts” about pension 
systems allows a more comprehensive picture of the pension 
contribution/financing situation than has been possible heretofore. 
Table 5 provides new estimates of the income tax foregone by 
the tax treatment of pensions. These are compared with estimates by 
the Revenue for 2000. 
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Table 5: Estimates of Tax Foregone on Pension Contributions, SWITCH and Revenue 
Commissioners 
      
Component SWITCH 
Estimate 
of Tax 
Foregone 
2000 
Revenue 
Estimate of 
Tax 
Foregone, 
2000/01 
SWITCH as 
Percentage 
of Revenue 
Estimate 
 
SWITCH 
Estimated 
Aggregate 
Contributions 
Average 
Tax Rate 
Implied by 
SWITCH 
Analysis 
 
€m Per 
Annum 
€m Per 
Annum % 
€m Per 
Annum % 
Employee contributions 255 472 54 820 31 
 
Self-employed/ retirement  
 annuity premia 111 205 54 362 31 
 
Employer contributions 922 646 143 2,321 40 
 
Government as employer, 
 contribution equivalent 706 n.a. n.a. 1751 40 
 
Total, excluding 
 government 1,288 1,323 97 3,503 37 
      
 
For both employees and the self-employed, the SWITCH 
estimate of tax foregone is 54 per cent of the corresponding 
Revenue estimate. For employer contributions, however, the 
SWITCH estimate is more than 40 per cent higher than the Revenue 
estimate. Given that the employer contributions are estimated as a 
residual from the average total rates of contribution, this may arise if 
employees in reporting their incomes understate or neglect to state 
the amount of their own contribution. In this case the estimate may 
be close to the total contribution, though the split between employer 
and employee is inaccurate. Thus, the ratio between the SWITCH 
estimate of the cost of tax relief for employer, employee and self-
employed contributions is very similar to the Revenue estimate. It 
should be noted, however, that the SWITCH estimate is derived by 
attributing the benefit of employer contributions to the relevant 
individuals, so that the tax relief is at the relevant personal rate of 
tax. The Revenue estimates, on the other hand, may value the tax 
relief of employer contributions made by companies at the relevant, 
and much lower, corporate income tax rate. 
 When this is taken into account, it seems likely that the 
SWITCH estimates of the value of tax foregone are lower than 
might be expected. One factor contributing to this is that, in general, 
household survey data do not obtain good coverage of the very 
highest echelons of the income distribution – a group which tends to 
have very large pension contributions. Another, mentioned earlier, is 
the assumption that total contribution rates are constant across 
income groups, when tax efficiency suggests that contribution rates 
are likely to rise with income. 
Some further evidence on the internal consistency of the 
estimates is provided by the implicit tax rate (the value of the tax 
relief divided by the total amount of contributions in the relevant 
category). For employees this is 31 per cent, at a time when the 
standard tax rate was 22 per cent, and the top tax rate 44 per cent. 
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As higher rate taxpayers are known to be more likely to contribute to 
pension schemes, and more likely to contribute greater amounts, this 
is not implausible. The implicit tax rates for employer contributions 
and imputed government contributions seem rather closer to the top 
tax rate than one might expect. On the other hand, the implicit tax 
rate for the self-employed is no higher than that for employees, 
when a higher figure might have been expected. These results 
suggest that further work is required in calibrating the estimates of 
contributions, but it is nonetheless of interest to use these initial 
estimates as a basis for an exploration of policy issues. 
The inequity of having higher rates of support for the pensions 
of high-earners (top rate taxpayers) is recognised in the National 
Pensions Review (Pensions Board, 2005).8 The approach suggested 
there is one of “levelling up” support so that all those paying 
contributions to private pensions would enjoy relief at the top tax 
rate. But this involves extra resources for those who can afford to 
pay for private pensions (and still involves greater amounts for those 
with top incomes). An alternative is to allow the relief at a single 
lower rate than 40 per cent. Here, for simplicity, we examine policies 
involving standardisation at the standard tax rate of 20 per cent, as 
has been implemented for mortgage interest tax relief and health 
insurance premia. We look at the impact of doing this and 
channelling some of the resources gained by the Exchequer into an 
increase of €50 per week in the State pension. 
Table 6: Standardisation of Pension Tax Relief and €50 Rise in State 
Pensions 
   
Decile 
Aggregate Gain/loss in  
€m Per Annum Percentage Gain 
Bottom 4 0.3 
2nd 88 3.5 
3rd 430 14.3 
4th 267 5.2 
5th 48 0.8 
6th -12 -0.2 
7th -94 -1.2 
8th -183 -2.1 
9th -403 -3.8 
Top -770 -4.3 
All -626 -0.9 
   
 
Table 6 shows that the net gains from this package are 
concentrated in the third and fourth deciles. The greatest 
proportionate gain is also for the third decile. This reflects the 
 
8 It should be noted, however, that the structure of the social insurance system, 
with pay-related contributions and flat rate benefits, is an offsetting influence. A 
closer study of the redistributive impact of the social insurance system, taking into 
account life cycle elements, would be of considerable interest. 
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improvements in the relative income position of pensioners in recent 
years. On balance, there are losses for all deciles in the top half of 
the income distribution. 
It should be noted, however, that this reform is not revenue-
neutral. It generates over €600 million per annum of extra net 
revenue for the Exchequer. These resources could be used to 
redesign the package in various ways. For example, instead of full 
standardisation, part of the pension contributions could be allowed 
against the top rate of tax, thus moderating the income losses for 
top-rate taxpayers associated with the package. That is, of course, on 
the assumption that additional resources on this scale are indeed 
generated by this change in tax treatment of pensions. The sums 
shown are the product of an arithmetic calculation assuming a 
change in tax treatment and no change in the size of the flows 
involved. It is likely that behaviour would in fact change, with some 
of the resources previously channelled into private pensions being 
redirected towards other tax-favoured forms of saving. It is 
extremely difficult to judge how great this response might be – and it 
could be taken into account in adjusting tax treatment of other types 
of saving if necessary – but it would have to be factored in to an 
assessment of the overall budgetary impact. (The potential sensitivity 
to changes in tax treatment provides one rationale for moving to 
standard-rating the relief rather than abolishing it entirely.) 
What of the impact on poverty? We look first at the impact on 
the risks of income poverty for older people, and then at the 
implications for overall poverty risk. Table 7 shows the effect on the 
head count and “poverty gap per person” measures at both the 50 
per cent and 60 per cent of median income cut-offs. (It should be 
remembered that the initial poverty risks are the result of a 
simulation of the year 2006, based on uprated 2000 data – these are 
not intended as precise estimates of poverty rates in 2006, but 
 
Table 7: Risks of Income Poverty: Headcount and Poverty Gap at 50 
Per Cent and 60 Per Cent of Median Income: Baseline 
Estimates (2006) and Pension Reform Package 
    
 Baseline Pension 
Reform 
Package 
Percentage 
Change in 
Measure 
‘At Risk of Poverty’ 
Headcount  
% % % 
50 per cent of median 
 income 
 
8.2 
 
1.3 
 
84 
 
60 per cent of median 
 income 
 
40.5 
 
3.1 
 
92 
 
Poverty Gap 
50 per cent of median 
 income 0.7 0.4 43 
 
60 per cent of median 
 income 5.0 0.7 86 
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incorporate many key features of the 2006 situation. Our interest, 
however, is in changes in poverty risk due to policy changes, and 
here the simulations have an advantage over actual data in being able 
to “hold constant” all things other than policy.) 
The pension reform package involving standardisation of income 
tax relief and a higher State pension leads to the virtual elimination 
of the risk of income poverty at both the 50 per cent and 60 per cent 
lines. Correspondingly, the poverty gap measures also fall to very 
low levels. 
 
 In this paper we have examined risks of income poverty for older 
people in Ireland. Over time, the ‘at risk of poverty rate’ (at 60 per 
cent of median income) rose from low levels in 1994 to over 40 per 
cent around the year 2000, but has been coming down since then 
and is now close to the average for all persons. The Irish rate is 
relatively high in EU comparative perspective, while the lowest risk 
of poverty for older people in Western Europe was in the 
Netherlands, a country with a strong basic pension and mandatory 
occupational pensions. Older people in Ireland have lower than 
average consistent poverty rates – that is, when both low income and 
direct measures of deprivation are used – with home ownership, 
financial assets and family support all contributing to explaining this 
contrast with the picture based on income alone. 
5. 
Conclusions 
The impact of recent changes in State pension rates on the risk of 
poverty was identified. While the impact on the “head count” 
measure of poverty was limited, the changes did reduce the depth of 
poverty for older people substantially. 
A restructuring of State supports for public and private pensions, 
limiting tax relief on pension contributions to the standard rate of 
tax, offers scope for substantial reductions in poverty for older 
people. On a purely arithmetic basis, standardisation could bring in 
to the Exchequer more than enough resources to allow the State 
pensions to be increased by €50 per week, which would virtually 
eliminate the risk of income poverty for older people. There are, of 
course, many issues involved in such a restructuring. Some of these 
are discussed in the paper, but others are left for further research, 
including the implications of demographic ageing, and how the flow 
into pension-related savings would respond, which would determine 
the impact on revenue for the Exchequer. However, the results 
indicate that further analysis of options of this type is well 
worthwhile.  
Changes in the structure of long-standing tax reliefs often 
incorporate an element of “grandfathering” i.e., protecting those 
who have relied upon the relief by prolonging it for existing 
beneficiaries for some period of time. One could interpret our 
results on the package involving standardisation of relief and a 
higher State pension as pertaining to a regime announced now, and 
put into effect for the future. Contributions already paid would have 
attracted full relief, and contributions might continue to attract full 
relief for some specified period, or for those within a certain distance 
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of the standard retirement age. But gradually, new entrants or new 
contributions would attract relief only at the standard rate, allowing a 
transition from the current situation to a new regime like that 
outlined here. 
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APPENDIX: AN EU 
PERSPECTIVE ON 
INCOME POVERTY 
RISKS AMONG OLDER 
PEOPLE 
As part of the EU’s Social Inclusion Process, a range of indicators 
are monitored to allow progress to be tracked over time, and figures 
on these are available in a database produced and regularly updated 
by Eurostat. Using these figures to put poverty among older people 
in Ireland in comparative perspective is complicated by the fact that 
there are significant differences between the income concept used by 
Eurostat and that used in national analyses of Irish data by the CSO 
(in its regular publications based on the Irish element of the EU 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions) and the ESRI (in analyses of the 
Irish element of SILC and of the earlier Living in Ireland Survey). The 
most important is the treatment of pensions which are privately 
organised by the individual, most often the self-employed, not 
forming part of a State or occupational scheme. In national Irish 
analyses, these are considered as part of disposable income, but in 
the EU-level database they are excluded. Persons relying on this 
income, and without sufficient income from other sources, will 
therefore, be deemed to be ‘at risk of poverty’ in EU-level analyses, 
whereas the national level approach may find they have sufficient 
income, including private pensions, to keep them above the poverty 
threshold. The treatment of pension contributions (public or 
occupational, not private) also differs in that the Eurostat database 
treats superannuation contributions as a deduction from gross 
income before arriving at disposable income; national level analysis 
treats superannuation contributions as part of disposable income. 
The origins of these differences lie in different institutional 
structures, which make standardisation of the measurement 
approach problematic. 
To illustrate where Ireland stands in terms of these EU figures 
we can use the recent review of EU experience regarding the risk of 
poverty for older people by Zaidi et al. (2006a), which drew on the 
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Eurostat figures. Table A1 shows the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and 
median poverty gap for those aged 65 years or over for each 
member state in 2002 or 2003. We see that Ireland is shown as 
having an ‘at risk of poverty’ rate of 41 per cent, which is much 
higher than most of the other countries and exceeded only by 
Cyprus. This is much higher than the figure of 20 per cent shown by 
the latest figures for Ireland produced by the CSO. The latter relates 
to 2005 rather than 2003, and employs a different adjustment factor 
in adjusting income for household size, but the different treatment 
of some types of pension must also play a role in producing this 
difference – the extent to which it is responsible is an important 
issue for further research.  
Table A1: Proportion of Older People ‘at Risk of Poverty’ in Member 
States and Median Poverty Gap Among those Older 
People ‘at Risk of Poverty’ 
    
Country  Survey Year ‘At Risk of 
Poverty’ Rate 
(%) 
Median Poverty Gap 
as % of Poverty Line 
Czech Republic  2003 4 7 
Poland  2002 7 14 
Hungary  2002 8 11 
Netherlands  2002 8 7 
France  2002 10 10 
Latvia  2002 10 8 
Lithuania  2002 12 13 
Luxembourg  2003 12 24 
    
Slovakia  2003 13 15 
Sweden  2002 15 11 
Germany  2003 16 17 
Austria  2003 16 17 
Estonia  2003 17 10 
Italy  2001 17 21 
Finland  2003 17 11 
Slovenia  2002 19 17 
Malta  2000 20 17 
Denmark  2003 21 9 
Belgium  2003 23 17 
    
United Kingdom  2003 25 18 
Greece  2003 28 27 
Spain  2003 28 22 
Portugal  2001 30 22 
Ireland  2003 41 14 
Cyprus  2003 52 24 
EU 15  2003 18.8 17 
New Member States  2003 8.5 13 
EU 25  2003 17.4 16 
    
Note: Countries ranked by ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, lowest to highest and divided 
into “low”, “medium” and “high” poverty risk groups by Zaidi et al. 
Source: Zaidi et al. (2006a), Tables 1 and 5. Details of sources are given by Zaidi et al. 
in Box 1. For Ireland, the source is EU SILC 2003, from the Eurostat 
website at http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int  
  
 
  
